There is no evidence for order mattering; therefore, orderdoes not matter: An appeal to ignorance

• Egan J., Chernoff ^[1] ; Gale, Russell ^[3] ; Ilona, Vashchyshyn ^[1] ; Heidi, Neufeld ^[1] ; Nat, Banting ^[2]
  1. [1] University of Saskatchewan

     University of Saskatchewan

     Canadá

     
  2. [2] University of Alberta

     University of Alberta

     Canadá

     
  3. [3] Univerity of Regina

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• Localización: Avances de investigación en educación matemática: AIEM, ISSN-e 2254-4313, Nº. 11, 2017, págs. 5-24
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.35763/aiem.v1i11.179
• Títulos paralelos:
  • No hay evidencia para la importancia del orden; por tanto el orden no importa: Una apelación a la ignorancia
  • Não há evidência de que a ordem seja importante; por isso, a ordem não importa: Um apelo àignorância
  • Il n’y a pas d’évidence que l’ordre importe ; alors, l’ordre n’importe pas: Un appel àl’ignorancef
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• Resumen
  • español

    Dentro del limitado campo de investigación sobre el conocimiento probabilístico del profesor, las respuestas incorrectas, inconsistentes o incluso inexplicables se explican frecuentemente usando marcos teóricos basados en las heurísticas y el razonamiento informal. Más recientemente ha emergido nueva investigación basada en falacias lógicas, que se ha mostrado efectiva para explicar ciertas respuestas normativamente incorrectas a tareas probabilísticas. Este artículo contribuye a esta área emergente, mostrando como una particular falacia lógica conocida como “apelación a la ignorancia” es útil para explicar un conjuntode respuestas normativamente incorrectas de profesores de matemática de enseñanza primaria y secundaria en formación a una nueva tarea probabilística. También se sugiere que el foco sobre el enfoque clásico en la enseñanza de la probabilidad teórica contribuye al uso de esta falacia en particular.

  • English

    Within the limited field of research on teachers’probabilistic knowledge, incorrect, inconsistent and even inexplicable responses to probabilistic tasks are most often accounted for by utilizing theories, frameworks and modelsthatare based upon heuristic and informal reasoning. More recently, the emergence of new research based upon logical fallacies has been provingeffective in explainingcertain normatively incorrect responses to probabilistic tasks. This article contributes to this emerging area of research by demonstrating how a particular logicalfallacy, known as “an appeal to ignorance,”can be used to account for a specific set of normatively incorrect responsesprovided by prospective elementary and secondary mathematics teachersto a new probabilistic task.It is further suggested that afocus on the classical approach to teaching theoretical probability contributes to the use of this particular logical fallacy. e

  • français

    Dans le domaine limité de la recherche sur la connaissance des enseignants au sujet de la probabilité, des réponses incorrectes, inconsistantes et même inexplicables à des tâches probabilistes sont le plus souvent expliqués par le raisonnement heuristique et informel. Plus récemment, de nouvelles recherches basées sur les erreurs logiques se montrent efficaces pour expliquer certaines réponses incorrectes à des tâches probabilistes. Cet article contribue dans ce domaine de recherche émergente en démontrant comment une certaine erreur logique, connue sous le nom d’« appel à l’ignorance, » peut être utilisée pour expliquer un ensemble spécifique de réponses incorrectes fournies par de futurs enseignants du primaire et du secondaire à une nouvelle tâche probabiliste. On suggère aussi que l’accent mis sur l’approche classique d’enseigner la probabilité théorique contribuerait à l’emploi de cette erreur logique.

  • português

    No limitado campo de investigação sobre o conhecimento probabilístico dos professores, as respostas incorretas, inconsistentes e até mesmo inexplicáveis às tarefas probabilísticas são mais frequentemente explicadas pela utilização de teorias, estruturas e modelos baseados no raciocínio heurístico e informal. Mais recentemente, o surgimento de nova investigação baseada em falácias lógicas tem-se mostrado eficaz para explicar certas respostas normativamente incorretas a tarefas probabilísticas. Este artigo contribui para essa área emergente de investigação, demonstrando como uma falácia lógica particular, conhecida como "um apelo à ignorância", pode ser usada para explicar um conjunto específico de respostas normativamente incorretas dadas por futuros professores de matemática do ensino básico e secundário a uma nova tarefa de probabilidades. Sugere-se ainda que o foco na abordagem clássica para o ensino da probabilidade teórica contribui para o uso desta falácia lógica particular.

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