Simple games are a fundamental class of cooperative games. They have a huge relevance in several areas of computer science, social sciences and discrete applied mathematics. The algorithmic and computational complexity aspects of simple games have been gaining notoriety in the recent years. In this thesis we review different computational problems related to properties, parameters, and solution concepts of simple games. We consider different forms of representation of simple games, regular games and weighted games, and we analyze the computational complexity required to transform a game from one representation to another. We also analyze the complexity of several open problems under different forms of representation. In this scenario, we prove that the problem of deciding whether a simple game in minimal winning form is decisive (a problem that is associated to the duality problem of hypergraphs and monotone Boolean functions) can be solved in quasi-polynomial time, and that this problem can be polynomially reduced to the same problem but restricted to regular games in shift-minimal winning form. We also prove that the problem of deciding wheter a regular game is strong in shift-minimal winning form is coNP-complete. Further, for the width, one of the parameters of simple games, we prove that for simple games in minimal winning form it can be computed in polynomial time. Regardless of the form of representation, we also analyze counting and enumeration problems for several subfamilies of these games. We also introduce influence games, which are a new approach to study simple games based on a model of spread of influence in a social network, where influence spreads according to the linear threshold model. We show that influence games capture the whole class of simple games. Moreover, we study for influence games the complexity of the problems related to parameters, properties and solution concepts considered for simple games. We consider extremal cases with respect to demand of influence, and we show that, for these subfamilies, several problems become polynomial. We finish with some applications inspired on influence games. The first set of results concerns to the definition of collective choice models. For mediation systems, several of the problems of properties mentioned above are polynomial-time solvable. For influence systems, we prove that computing the satisfaction (a measure equivalent to the Rae index and similar to the Banzhaf value) is hard unless we consider some restrictions in the model. For OLFM systems, a generalization of OLF systems (van den Brink et al. 2011, 2012) we provide an axiomatization of satisfaction. The second set of results concerns to social network analysis. We define new centrality measures of social networks that we compare on real networks with some classical centrality measures.
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