Problemas de Elección Social en el Contexto de los Problemas de Asignación

• Julio César Macéas Ponce ^[1] ; Manuel Alejandro Siller Landin ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes

     Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes

     México

     
• Localización: BEIO, Boletín de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, ISSN 1889-3805, Vol. 40, Nº. 1, 2024
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Decisions are fundamental in people’s lives, but when it comes to collective decisions, the process of reaching an agreement becomes quite complicated to execute, and even more so if the intention is that everyone involved in the election is satisfied with the result. Therefore, it is necessary to develop methods where it could be possible to ensure that most of the participants agree with the decision made. In this work is proposed a new choice method whose objective is that, as far as possible, this purpose is achieved by employing the knowledge available from Operations Research. Different databases were obtained, belonging to voting carried out in certain cities of the USA, to which the proposed method was applied and the results obtained were compared with those obtained from making use of other election methods, in particular, with the simple majority rule, the Borda count and the Condorcet method. After the analysis of the data, it was discovered that the proposal is not equivalent to any of the other mentioned methods, and counterexamples were provided to justify this fact, which led to the conclusion that this new way of election can provide the foundations to formulate a new method of social choice.

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