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A Cooperative Game for Upstream–Downstream River Flooding Risk Prevention in Four European River Basins

  • Autores: Weronika Warachowska, Xana Álvarez Bermúdez, Nejc Bezak, María Gómez Rúa Árbol académico, Andrea Janeiro Otero, Piotr Matczak, Juan José Vidal Puga Árbol académico
  • Localización: Nature-based solutions for flood mitigation: environmental and socio-economic aspects / Carla Sofia S. Ferreira (aut.), Zahra Kalantari (aut.), Thomas Hartmann (aut.), Paulo Pereira (aut.), 2022, ISBN 978-3-030-77504-9, págs. 379-397
  • Idioma: español
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  • Resumen

    • This chapter tests whether a group of landowners living in the upstream part of a river basin could change land use to increase retention and thus decrease flood risk of the other group living in downstream parts of the river basin. A cooperative game theory model combined with cost–benefit analysis is applied in four river basin settings in Europe: Stille Oder (Germany), Pysznica (Poland), Vipava (Slovenia), and Lea (Spain). These settings demonstrate various characteristics differentiating among catchments in terms of their size and land use, such as agricultural, forestry, and urbanisation. Analysis reveals that in two of four river basins – Stille Oder (Germany) and Pysznica (Poland) – it is possible to find a mutually beneficial compromise between landowners to change land use (afforestation), which is economically reasonable for both of them, leading to flood risk reduction. The cost–benefit analysis was applied to estimate the possible total benefit of afforestation that was an input data to the game theory model. The model applied in this chapter offers insights for flood risk reduction relying on nature-based solutions. It determines the benefits of cooperation that can be achieved by decision-making process participants separately and their coalition when cooperating. The sharing-rule function can help planners to distribute the total benefits from flood loss reduction among landowners fairly. Afforestation appears a feasible method for flood risk management. The chapter also formulates further directions for game theory application in the field of environmental chemistry such as transportation of pollutants during flood events.

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