Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

Arantza Estévez-Fernández ^[1] ; Peter Borm ^[2] ; M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro ^[3]
1. [1] VU University Amsterdam
  
  VU University Amsterdam
  
  Países Bajos
2. [2] Tilburg University
  
  Tilburg University
  
  Países Bajos
3. [3] Universidade de Vigo
  
  Universidade de Vigo
  
  Vigo, España
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Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 28, Nº. 1, 2020, págs. 154-177
Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
- In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.