L’art de repartir recursos escassos

• José Manuel Giménez-Gómez ^[1] ; Cori Vilella-Bach ^[2]
  1. [1] Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
  2. [2] Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament de Gestió d'Empreses
• Localización: Materials matemàtics, ISSN-e 1887-1097, Nº. 0, 2021
• Idioma: catalán
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Referencias bibliográficas
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