Partial cooperation and convex sets

• Autores: Jorge J. López Vázquez , José Enrique Romero García
• Localización: Sort: Statistics and Operations Research Transactions, ISSN 1696-2281, Vol. 27, Nº. 2, 2003, págs. 139-152
• Idioma: inglés
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Cooperación parcial y conjuntos convexos
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo  1    2 (pdf) 
• Resumen

  • We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made up of coalition systems, in which every unit coalition is feasible and every coalition of players can be expressed as a disjoint union of maximal feasible coalitions. These systems are named partition systems and cause restricted games. To sum up, we study feasible coalition systems delined by a partial order designed for a set of players and we analyze the characteristics of a feasible coalition system developed from a family of convex sets.

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