A monotonic and merge‐proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations

María Gómez Rúa ^[1] ; Vidal Puga ^[1]
1. [1] Research Group in Economic Analysis. Universidade de Vigo
Localización: XII Congreso Galego de Estatística e Investigación de Operacións: Lugo, 22-23-24 de outubro de 2015. Actas / María José Ginzo Villamayor (ed. lit.), José María Alonso Meijide (ed. lit.) , Luis Alberto Ramil Novo (ed. lit.), 2015, ISBN 978-84-8192-522-7, págs. 33-39
Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
- We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, so that the planner can identify the agents that merge. Under this new framework, and as opposed to the traditional model, there exist rules that satisfy merge-proofness. Besides, by strengthening this property and adding some other properties, such as population-monotonicity and solidarity, we characterize a unique rule that coincides with the weighted Shapley value of an associated cost game.