Bargaining sets in finite economies

• Carlos Hervés-Beloso ^[1] ; Javier Hervés-Estévez ^[1] ; Emma Moreno-García ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidade de Vigo

     Universidade de Vigo

     Vigo, España

     
  2. [2] Universidad de Salamanca

     Universidad de Salamanca

     Salamanca, España

     
• Localización: Working paper series ( RGEA ), Nº. 5, 2017
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism `a la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colell’s bargaining set for replicas of a finite economy.

    Our main result shows the persistence of Anderson et al. (1997) non-convergence of the bargaining sets to the set of Walrasian allocations. In addition, we analyze how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set.