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Fall back proper equilibrium

  • John Kleppe [1] ; Peter Borm [1] ; Ruud Hendrickx [1]
    1. [1] Tilburg University

      Tilburg University

      Países Bajos

  • Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 25, Nº. 2, 2017, págs. 402-412
  • Idioma: inglés
  • DOI: 10.1007/s11750-017-0447-2
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  • Resumen
    • Proper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment in which the players play a passive role is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper, we introduce a more active role for the players, leading to the refinement of fall back proper equilibrium.


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