Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource

• E. Gutiérrez ^[1] ; N. Llorca ^[1] ; J. Sánchez-Soriano ^[1] ; M. A. Mosquera ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

     Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

     Elche, España

     
  2. [2] Universidade de Vigo

     Universidade de Vigo

     Vigo, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 25, Nº. 2, 2017, págs. 394-401
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s11750-017-0438-3
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• Resumen

  • In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The profit that a producer can attain depends on the amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure. We contemplate a competitive process among the producers and study the corresponding non-cooperative games, describing their (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. It is shown that strict Nash equilibria form a subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a proper subset of Nash equilibria.