Bankruptcy problems with two references: an impartial compromise

• José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ^[1] ; António Osório ^[1] ; Josep E. Peris ^[2]
  1. [1] Universitat Rovira i Virgili

     Universitat Rovira i Virgili

     Tarragona, España

     
  2. [2] Universitat d'Alacant

     Universitat d'Alacant

     Alicante, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 24, Nº. 1, 2016, págs. 131-142
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Pulido et al. (Annals Oper Res 158:133–141, 2008) present an extension of the classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill in Math Social Sci 2:345–371, 1982) where the involved agents have, apart from the claims vector, an additional reference vector. To analyze this extended problem, they propose the extreme and the diagonal approaches, both of them restricted to the case in which the reference vector is lower than the claims vector. We note that if the claims and the reference vectors are interchanged, the allocation proposed by the extreme approach varies. Therefore, by introducing the idea of impartiality, in the current approach, we propose an extension of their model in which no relation is assumed between the claims and reference vectors.