Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game

• Julio González-Díaz ^[1] ; Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo ^[2] ; Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo ^[2] ; Estela Sánchez Rodríguez ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

     Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

     Santiago de Compostela, España

     
  2. [2] Universidade de Vigo

     Universidade de Vigo

     Vigo, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 23, Nº. 3, 2015, págs. 773-798
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s11750-014-0358-4
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • One of the main goals of this paper is to improve the understanding of the way in which the core of a specific cooperative game, the airport game (Littlechild and Owen, Manag Sci 20:370–372, 1973), responds to monotonicity properties. Since such properties are defined for single-valued allocation rules, we use the core-center (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, Int J Game Theory 36:27–46, 2007) as a proxy for the core. This is natural, since the core-center is the center of gravity of the core and its behavior with respect to a given property can be interpreted as the “average behavior” of the core. We also introduce the lower-cost increasing monotonicity and higher-cost decreasing monotonicity properties that reflect whether a variation in a particular agent’s cost is beneficial to the other agents.