A constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games

• R. Branzei ^[1] ; N. Llorca ^[2] ; J. Sánchez-Soriano ^[2] ; S. Tijs ^[3]
  1. [1] Alexandru Ioan Cuza University

     Alexandru Ioan Cuza University

     Rumanía

     
  2. [2] Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

     Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

     Elche, España

     
  3. [3] Tilburg University

     Tilburg University

     Países Bajos

     

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• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 22, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 860-874
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper deals with a constrained egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games named the d value. It is proved that the d value of a convex multi-choice game belongs to the precore, Lorenz dominates each other element of the precore and possesses a population monotonicity property regarding players’ participation levels. Furthermore, an axiomatic characterization is given where a specific consistency property plays an important role.