A weak version of Barberà-Kelly's Theorem

• Autores: Ramón Augusto Pino Pérez, Jahn Franklin Leal Hernández
• Localización: Revista Colombiana de Matemáticas, ISSN-e 0034-7426, Vol. 51, Nº. 2, 2017, págs. 173-194
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.15446/recolma.v51n2.70900
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Una versión débil del teorema de Barberà-Kelly
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
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