Bargaining and membership

María Gómez-Rúa ^[1] ; Juan Vidal-Puga ^[1]
1. [1] Universidade de Vigo
  
  Universidade de Vigo
  
  Vigo, España
Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 22, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 800-814
Idioma: inglés
Enlaces
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Resumen
- In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.