Bargaining and membership

• María Gómez-Rúa ^[1] ; Juan Vidal-Puga ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade de Vigo

     Universidade de Vigo

     Vigo, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 22, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 800-814
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.