Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

• Oriol Tejada ^[1]
  1. [1] Universitat de Barcelona

     Universitat de Barcelona

     Barcelona, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 21, Nº. 1, 2013, págs. 189-205
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We introduce the class of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games which generalizes the well-known two-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games to markets with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the core and the corresponding extreme allocations of any multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of a multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game is stable in the sense of von Neumann–Morgenstern.