A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games

• Chih Chang ^[1] ; Stef Tijs ^[2]
  1. [1] National Tsing Hua University

     National Tsing Hua University

     Taiwán

     
  2. [2] Tilburg University

     Tilburg University

     Países Bajos

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 14, Nº. 2, 2006, págs. 333-342
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/bf02837566
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • In this note, we will give several examples to illustrate that two essential games which are isomorphic are not necessarily S-equivalent when the cores of both games are “small” or empty. In other words, we show that whether two isomorphic games are S-equivalent can not be justified in terms of the “size” of the core.