Índices de Poder. Como evaluar el poder

• Seijas Macías, J. Antonio ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade da Coruña

     Universidade da Coruña

     A Coruña, España

     
• Localización: Anales de ASEPUMA, ISSN-e 2171-892X, Nº. 23, 2015
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    No existe un consenso sobre las propiedades que debería tener un índice de poder de voto cuando existen varios votantes con un conjunto de votos ponderados. Penrose-Banzhaf y Sahpely-Shubik establecieron índices en base a las ponderaciones. Si seguimos la literatura de teoría de juegos cooperativos obtenemos diferentes índices que intentan medir el poder de las coaliciones que se puedan formar entre los diversos agentes o jugadores. Aun suponiendo que todas las coaliciones son posibles, estas sólo aportan poder a sus miembros en la medida en que sus integrantes son jugadores tipo swing. En esta línea se encuentran índices basados en el valor de Shapley, como los índices de Deegan-Packel, Holler-Packel y los Shift power index. También haremos referencia a los índices basados en el concepto de nucleolo del juego. En este trabajo presentamos los diferentes índices e intentamos ver cuales deben ser las propiedades que definen un índice de poder. El objetivo es ver en que medida las diferentes aproximaciones permiten evaluar el poder real de un colectivo representado a través de un órgano colegiado con voto ponderado.

  • English

    No consensus exists about the properties that would have to have an power index of vote, when there are several voters with a group of weighted votes Penrose-Banzhaf and Sahpely-Shubik established indexes in base to the weighted of the different voters. Following the literature of theory of cooperative games different indexes are obtained, that try measuring the power of the coalitions that can be formed between the agents or players. Although every coalitions are possible only swing members have a positive payoff of the coalition. In this line we find indexes based in the value of Shapley, like the indexes of Deegan-Packel, Holler-Packel and the Shift power index. Also we will do reference to the indexes based in the concept of nucleolus of the game. In this work, we present the different indexes and try to see which have to be the properties that define an index to be able to. The aim is to see in that measured different approximations allow to approximate the real power of a community represented through a collegiate body with weighted votes.

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