On two basic properties of Equilibria of voting with exit

• Dolors Berga ^[3] ; Gustavo Bergantiños ^[4] ; Jordi Massó ^[1] ; Alejandro Neme ^[2]
  1. [1] Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

     Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

     Barcelona, España

     
  2. [2] Universidad Nacional de San Luis

     Universidad Nacional de San Luis

     Argentina

     
  3. [3] girona
  4. [4] vigo

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• Localización: Working paper series ( RGEA ), Nº. 15, 2008
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty.