La conciencia irreductible: los bastiones De Mcginn y Velmans

• Autores: Juan Francisco Correcher Valls
• Localización: Thémata: Revista de filosofía, ISSN-e 2253-900X, ISSN 0212-8365, Nº 47, 2013, págs. 79-101
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    El presente trabajo revisa dos autores relevantes en la filosofía de la mente contemporánea por sus tesis y argumentos anti-reductivistas respecto al problema mente-cuerpo. Colin McGinn es el mayor representante del nuevo misterianismo, postura que califica la conexión mente-cuerpo como misteriosa en virtud de un cierre cognitivo que nos veta su compresión. Por otro lado, Max Velmans propone una teoría de doble aspecto en la tradición de Spinoza que denomina monismo reflexivo. Tras repasar sus enfoques, se plantean y revisan algunas objeciones.

  • English

    This paper reviews two authors who are relevant in contemporary philosophy of mind because of their antireductionist arguments and theses regarding mind-body problem. Colin McGinn is the best representative of new mysterianism, position that considers the mind-body connection as a mystery in virtue of a cognitive closure which prevents us from understanding that link. On the other hand, Max Velmans proposes a double-aspect theory in the tradition of Spinoza called reflexive monism. After reviewing these approaches, some objections will be reviewed as well.

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