The Mathematics of Referendum Elections and Separable Preferences

• Autores: Jonathan K. Hodge
• Localización: Mathematics magazine, ISSN 0025-570X, Vol. 84, Nº. 4, 2011, págs. 268-277
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.4169/math.mag.84.4.268
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• Resumen

  • Voters in referendum elections are often required to cast simultaneous ballots on several possibly related questions or proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter�s preferences on one question or set of questions depend on the known or predicted outcomes of other questions. Nonseparable preferences can lead to seemingly paradoxical election outcomes, such as a winning outcome that is the last choice of every voter. In this article, we survey recent mathematical results related to the separability problem in referendum elections. We explore the structure of interdependent preferences, consider related combinatorial and algebraic results, and examine the practical impact of separability on the outcomes of referendum elections.