Resumen de The Not-quite Non-atomic game:: the Role of Differentiability for the Core of Production Games

Martha Saboyá Baquero, Guillermo Owen

• In Aumman and Shapley (1974), hereafter referred to as A/S, is presented a remarkable study of non-atomic games. In that paper the question of the relation between the core and the Shapley value of very large games is studied in detail. In particular, productive economies are analyzed. In that regard, one assumes a continuum of individuals, each of them is regarded as a profit maximizing producer endowed with his technology and resource bundle, pooling his private endowments to achieve better outcomes. They proved under certain regularity conditions, that the core of the corresponding production game is non-empty and it consists of a single point, which coincides with the nonatomic Shapley value. This value is based on a vector of equilibrium prices for the goods in an endowment