Condorcet Consistency of the Citizen-Candidate Approach

• Autores: Bernardo Moreno Jiménez , María Socorro Puy Segura
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese , Francisco Ramón Fernández García , 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 36
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The electoral mechanism in a citizen-candidate approach consist of two stages. In the first stage, each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate, and in the second stage the citizens vote to elect a candidate. In a single-peaked preference domain, we find that the strategic entry decision of the candidates eliminates some of the undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections, since as we show, the Condorcet winner is always elected. It is in four or more candidate elections that the Condorcet Loser can be chosen. These main results are obtained for two different kinds of voting behavior: sincere voting and strategic voting.