Inventory games with discount

• Autores: Andrés Toledo Casado, Ana Meca Martínez
• Localización: XXVI Congreso Nacional de Estadística e Investigación Operativa: Úbeda, 6-9 de noviembre de 2001, 2001, ISBN 84-8439-080-2
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Toledo and Meca (2001) study how a single firm, under different price policies applied by the supplier, can minimize the average cost per time unit of its inventory. Meca et al. (1999) analyze several cooperative TU games related to the cooperation between a collective of firms in order to minimize its joint inventory. In this paper we introduce a research line about a new class of cooperative TU games in which, following the philosophy of models given in Toledo and Meca (2001) and in contrast to games in Meca et al. (1999), the price of the product to hold in inventory depends on the order size.