On some basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
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Autores: Dolors Berga
, Gustavo Bergantiños Cid , Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó
- Localización: Working paper series ( RGEA ), Nº. 4, 2004
- Idioma: español
- Enlaces
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Resumen
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the e.ect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy some basic properties (stability and voter's sovereignty) whenever members have monotonic and separable preferences.
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