Algunos progresos y problemas en la Ciencia de la decisión
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Autores: Sixto Ríos Insua
- Localización: Revista matemática complutense, ISSN-e 1988-2807, ISSN 1139-1138, Vol. 11, Nº 1, 1998, págs. 113-141
- Idioma: español
- DOI: 10.5209/rev_rema.1998.v11.n1.17310
- Enlaces
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Resumen
The study of decision making and problem solving has attracted much attention. Since the middle of this century the notion of rational decision making was associated with expected utulity maximization, albeit in a very different way than D. Bernoulli (1738) envisioned. For decisions under risk, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) formulated the axioms for expected utility. For decisions under uncertainty Savage (1954) developped the axioms leading simultaneously to subjective probability and expected utility maximization.
In recent decades, the decision theory literature has been dominated by many normative models and prescriptive methods or questions concerning how these models can be made more applicable. Most of research on decision making and problem solving carried on at the Department of Statistics and Operations Research of the Universidad Complutense after 1950 is exposed.
