The constrained equal losses family of rules for claims problems

• José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ^[1] ; Foroogh Salekpay ^[1] ; Cori Vilella ^[1]
  1. [1] Universitat Rovira i Virgili

     Universitat Rovira i Virgili

     Tarragona, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 33, Nº. 1, 2025, págs. 56-73
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s11750-024-00677-9
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • In this study, we introduce a family of rules for claims problems called the CEL-family. The family is defined by means of a parameter θ∈[0,1] as a notion of solidarity and contribution. It contains the constrained equal losses and the constrained equal awards rules. We perform an axiomatic analysis considering the main properties in the literature, for the sake of comparison. We apply the family to the distribution of the European Regional Development Funds to study how the rules in the family treat regions with relatively smaller claims compared to regions with relatively larger claims.

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