Analysis of Vulnerabilities in the Automatic Reconnection of Devices to Known Wi-Fi Networks

• Daniel Santiago-Cernadas ^[1] ; Jose Vazquez-Naya ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade da Coruña

     Universidade da Coruña

     A Coruña, España

     
• Localización: Proceedings XoveTIC 2024: Impulsando el talento científico / coord. por Manuel Lagos Rodríguez, Tirso Varela Rodeiro, Javier Pereira-Loureiro , Manuel Francisco González Penedo , 2024, págs. 433-440
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • While modern Wi-Fi security protocols such as WPA2-PSK and WPA3-PSK enhance encryption to protect against password cracking and packet sniffing, they may still be vulnerable to certain attacks. Specifically, under certain conditions, an attacker could spoof a legitimate access point (AP) to establish a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack. This study investigates whether different devices are able to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed APs, and examines how they respond to such impersonation attempts. By analyzing device behavior in these scenarios, we aim to assess the effectiveness of current security measures and highlight potential vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi network reconnection mechanisms.