Abstract
This paper presents a sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems. Based on the ascending order of claims, two consequential games are introduced, called the divide-and-choose game and the divide-and-object game. We prove that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of each game is consistent with the allocation of the constrained equal awards rule.
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This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant numbers 71671440 and 72071159].
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Gong, D., Xu, G., Jin, X. et al. A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems. TOP 30, 359–379 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-021-00617-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-021-00617-x