Abstract
This paper investigates how demand is apportioned to facilities by customers, given that they apply one of a number of utility functions according to which they satisfy their demand at the facilities. After delineating the basic decision-making process, a number of reasonable assumptions are formulated regarding the behavior of the utility functions after a scaling of their different parameters. The individual apportionment rules are examined so as to whether or not they satisfy these assumptions. The results are of importance for decision-makers that must use these utility functions when facing locational decisions.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of an anonymous referee. Professor Marianov gratefully acknowledges the support by Grants FONDECYT 1190064 and CONICYT PIA AFB180003.
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Eiselt, H.A., Marianov, V. Stability of utility functions and apportionment rules in location models. TOP 28, 772–792 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-020-00569-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-020-00569-8