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Rejoinder on: Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

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Notes

  1. Note that the directed relations between the countries along the river has a very different interpretation than in hierarchically structured firms, where they express some authority. In the river situation they simply describe the upstream-downstream location along the river.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    René van den Brink

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  1. René van den Brink
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Correspondence to René van den Brink.

Additional information

This rejoinder refers to the comments available at doi:10.1007/s11750-017-0439-2, doi:10.1007/s11750-017-0441-8, and doi:10.1007/s11750-017-0442-7.

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van den Brink, R. Rejoinder on: Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications. TOP 25, 45–48 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0443-6

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