Abstract
In this study, we provide a new solution for cooperative games with coalition structures. The collective value of a player is defined as the sum of the equal division of the pure surplus obtained by his coalition from the coalitional bargaining and of his Shapley value for the internal coalition. The weighted Shapley value applied to a game played by coalitions with coalition-size weights is assigned to each coalition, reflecting the size asymmetries among coalitions. We show that the collective value matches exogenous interpretations of coalition structures and provide an axiomatic foundation of this value. A noncooperative mechanism that implements the collective value is also presented.
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Kamijo, Y. The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures. TOP 21, 572–589 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0191-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0191-y
Keywords
- Coalition structure
- Two-step Shapley value
- Weighted Shapley value
- Coalition-size weights
- Axiomatization
- Implementation