Abstract
We analyze the concept of large set for a coalitional game v introduced by Martínez-de-Albéniz and Rafels (Int. J. Game Theory 33(1):107–114, 2004). We give some examples and identify some of these sets. The existence of such sets for any game is proved, and several properties of largeness are provided. We focus on the minimality of such sets and prove its existence using Zorn’s lemma.
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Institutional support from research grants (Generalitat de Catalunya) 2005SGR00984 and (Spanish Government and FEDER) SEJ2005-02443/ECON is gratefully acknowledged, and the support of the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA.
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Martínez-de-Albéniz, F.J., Rafels, C. Minimal large sets for cooperative games. TOP 15, 242–255 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0016-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0016-1