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The Serial Property and Restricted Balanced Contributions in discrete cost sharing problems

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Abstract

We show that the Serial Poperty and Restricted Balanced Contributions characterize the subsidy-free serial cost sharing method (Moulin (1995)) in discrete cost allocation problems.

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This research has been partially supported by the Universidad del País Vasco (project UPV 00031.321-15352/2003), MCyT under projects BEC2003-08182 and SEJ2004-07554, and by the Generalitat Valenciana under project GRUPOS04/13.

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Calvo, E., Santos, J.C. The Serial Property and Restricted Balanced Contributions in discrete cost sharing problems. TOP 14, 343–353 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837567

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837567

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