Abstract
In this note, we will give several examples to illustrate that two essential games which are isomorphic are not necessarily S-equivalent when the cores of both games are “small” or empty. In other words, we show that whether two isomorphic games are S-equivalent can not be justified in terms of the “size” of the core.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chang C. (2000). Remarks on Theory of the Core.Naval Research Logistics 47, 455–458.
McKinsey J.C.C. (1950). Isomorphism of Games and Strategic Equivalence. In: Kuhn H.W. and Tucker A.W. (eds.),Contributions to the Theory of Games II. Annals of Mathematics Studies 24. Princeton University Press.
Peleg B. (1981). Personal communication.
Rafels C. and Tijs S. (1997). On the Cores of TU Cooperative Games and Stability of the Weber Set.International Journal of Game Theory 26, 491–499.
Tijs S.H. (1976). On S-Equivalence and Isomorphism of Games in Characteristic Function Form.International Journal of Game Theory 4, 209–210.
Xu S. (1996). Isomorphism in 3-Person Games.International Journal of Game Theory 25, 137–148.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Chang, C., Tijs, S. A note on isomorphism and strategic equivalence of cooperative games. TOP 14, 333–342 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837566
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02837566