Abstract
We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems and axiomatically characterize them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal distance rule.
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Herrero, C., Martínez, R. Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked. TOP 16, 272–283 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0043-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-008-0043-6