Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids

• Autores: R. van den Brink, Encarnación Algaba Durán , Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese , Andrés Jiménez Losada
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese , Francisco Ramón Fernández García , 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 81
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • can generate certain payoffs by cooperation. In a cooperative game the players are assumed to be socially identical in the sense that all subsets of N are feasible coalitions. However, in practice there exist social asymmetries among the players and there are restrictions on coalition formation. For this reason, the game theoretic analysis of decision processes in which one imposes asymmetric constraints on the behavior of the players has been and continues to be an important subject to study. Important consequences have been obtained of adopting this type of restrictions on economic behavior. As examples we mention the games with a priori coalition structures, and games with a limited communication graph.