Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

• Autores: Hans Peters, Walter Bossert, Jean Derks
• Localización: Abstracts of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications / coord. por Jesús Mario Bilbao Arrese , Francisco Ramón Fernández García , 2002, ISBN 84-472-0733-1, pág. 19
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts.

    It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.