Resumen de Social Interaction in Anti-Coordination Games

Dunia López Pintado , Yann Bramoulle, S. Goyal, Fernando Vega-Redondo

• We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 × 2 anti-coordination games. We characterize the nature of equilibrium network structures as well as study the effects of network structures on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that the structure of the equilibrium networks depends on the value of the cost of forming links. As the cost grows the structure is less connected and we get stable bipartite graphs.

  We also show that, the relative magnitude of the individuals doing each action in the anti-coordination game depends crucially on the cost of forming links.

  If the costs are high, then there is a wide variety of stable networks, some of them being very asymmetric bipartite graphs. However, if they are low, only the complete and essential graph with a particular proportion of individuals doing each action is stable.