Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games

• Autores: Rodica Branzei, Tamás Solymosi , Stef Tijs
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 15, Nº. 1, 2007, págs. 78-88
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s11750-007-0002-7
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• Resumen

  • We consider an extension of glove markets, called T-markets, characterize a family of weighted allocation rules, and define related cooperative games. For the class of T-market games we introduce a new solution concept called the type monotonic allocation scheme. It turns out that the nucleolus and the t-value generate the same type monotonic allocation scheme with nice extra properties.